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( _ I PRELIMINA7 Y ORANDUM 
Summer List 13, Sheet 1 
Nos.77 10, 77-11 , 77-12, ~ 
77 47, 77-64 (all ASX) ) 
EXX CORP. v. GOV. OF MARYLAND
1 
ELL OIL CO. v. GOV. OF ~~RYLAND 
CONTINENTAL OIL CO . v. GOV. OF MARYLAND 
GULF OIL CORP. v. GOV. OF MARYLAND 
ASHLAND OIL, INC. V. GOV. OF MARYLAND 
~";] from Md. CA (Eldridge 
urphy, C.J., ~ 3 J J . 
of the CA; + two As soc. J J . 
of the Ct. of Special 
Appeals, specially assigned) 
State/Civil (Timely) 
1. SUMMARY: Each of the appellants challenges the validi t y, 
under federal constitutional and statutory law, of a recently 
enacted Maryland statute concerning the marketing of petroleum 
products. Appellants predicate jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. §1257(1). -
1~here · are also three motions for leave to file amicus briefs. 
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2. FACTS: The focus of these appeals is Chapter 
854 of the Laws of Maryland of 1974, as amended by Chapter 
2 
608 of the Laws of 1975. These chapters, which are reproduced 
in the appendix to this memorandum, add important 
new provisiors to the Maryland ._ Motor Fuel :nspection Law. 
At the risk of oversimplification, the key aspects of 
the statute can be summarized as follows. Section B 
forbids a petroleum producer or refiner from opening a retail 
service station operated by company personnel. Section C 
requires petroleum producers and refiners to divest themselves 
of company-operated service stations. Section D requires 
every producer, refiner, and wholesaler of petroleum products 
supplying gasoline and special fuels to retail service stations 
to extend all voluntary allowances (i.e., reductions in fuel 
prices) uniformly to all retail service stations supplied. 
Section F requires that every producer, refiner, or wholesaler 
of petroleum products apportion uniformly all gasoline and special 
fuels to all retail service stations during fuel shortages. 
Chapter 854 was signed into law on May 31, 1974·, 
effective July 1, 1974. In June 1974, Exxon instituted 
an action in Md Circuit Court, seeking a declaratory judgment 
that Chapter 854 (the Chapter 608 amendments were later incorporaed 
in the suit) is unconstitutional and invalid. Additionally, 
It is codified in Maryland Code (1956, 1972 Repl. Vol., 1976 
Cum. Supp.) Art. 56 §157E. 
.,. 
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Exxon sought injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement of 
Chapter 854. Thereafter, other oil companies intervened. 
The Circuit Court granted appellants' motion for partial 
sununary jud~ent as to $et:tion. D, · rhoHling -
that provision to be in conflict with and preempted by 
provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act. The Circuit Court 
later entered a final judgment and decree declaring the statute -
violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of 
the federal Constitution and invalid as a taking of appellants' 
property without just compensation. The challenge to the 
statute under the C0rnmerce clause was rejected. Upon appeal 
to the Maryland Co1rt of Appeals, the decision of the trial 
court was unanimously reversed and the statute was upheld 
against all of the different challenges. 
At trial, extensive evidence was presented relating to the 
nature of the retail marketing of gasoline and petroleum products in Mary• 
land and the alleged impact that the statute would have on 
industry. Oil company officials testified that the Act would 
adversely affect consumers. They testified that by prohibiting 
producers and refiners from operating retail service stations, 
producers and refiners would lose the control over operations that 
is necessary to gauge accurately consumer preferences for such 
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innovative features as self-service stations, car wash facilities, 
and total car care service facilities offering a national 
guarantee, thus allegedly depriving the consumers in ~ryland 
of the wide variety of automotive services now available.The oil execu-
3 
fivf;'S also testified that company-operated service stations 
serve as training centers for independent dealers. 
4 
Additionally, executives of the three companies in 
Maryland that market solely through company-operated 
stations asserted that their type of low price-high volume stations 
could not be economically run with non-company personnel. 
Thus, according to the testimony, they would probably be forced 
to withdraw from the Maryland market if the Act were to become 
effective. 
Four economists, qualified as expert witnesses, also testified 
on behalf of the oil companies in opposition to the Act. In 
general, they believed tbe Act would reduce competition and 
would therefore be detrimental to the interests of the 
consumer. This reduction of competition would occur because, 
in their view, the Act would inhibit new competitors from 
entering the market, force existing, aggressive independent 
marketers out of the market, and would limit the variety 
3"Company-operated" station ·"refer to a retail service station 
operated directly by employees of a refiner or producer of petroleum 
products, or a subsidiary of a refiner or producer. It does not refer 
to retail service stations operated by a company engaged only in the 
marketing of petroleum products. 
4 
Ashland, Petroleum Marketing, and Kayo. 
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of auxiliary services available to consumers by discouraging 
tests of innovative marketing techniques. 
The State presented as its expert witness a Dr. Patterson, 
who is a professor of Business Administration and the author of 
two books on gasoline marketing. He testified that, in his opinion, 
the Act would actually enhance competition in gasoline marketing. 
Elimination of company-operated stations would preserve "intertype 
col'lpetition" which he described as competition among 
the various types of competitQrs ~ in the marketplace, such as 
5 
private brand, major brand, and non-integrated marketers. 
On the other hand, increased company operation of service stations 
would, in his view, enable major, integrated oil companies 
to use i,ncreased profits, resulting from the recent increases 
in crude oil prices, to drive various "price competitors" 
from the market as well as divert available gasoline supplies 
from independent, unbranded marketers. Such actions would, eventually, 
reduce overall competition in gasoline marketing. Evidence was 
also adduced by the State to show that several partialYor fully 
integrated oil companies planned either to increase the number 
of company-operated stations or to convert all stations to company 
5The designation. of "major" and"non-major" (or "priv-ate") 
producers and refiners is that of the Lundburg Survey, an industry 
statistical organization. There are apparently 37 private-brand 
producers and refiners who presently do some marketing in the U.S. 
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( - operations. This, the State argued, tended to support 
Dr. Patterson's opinion that the major oil companies would seek 
to reduce competition among gasoline marketers by reducing the 
number of competitors. 
Considerable evidence was also introduced concerning 
the history and purpose of the challenged statute . This 
indicated that the legislation was prompted by a study of gasoline 
retailing in Maryland undertaken by the Comptroller at the 
request of the governor. The study concluded that, in 
times of apparent gasoline shortage, company-operated 
stations "were virtually unaffected insofar as gasoline availability 
was concerned" while both branded and unbranded independents 
experienced "the greatest difficulty in obtaining gasoline" 
and the "greatest cost per gallonr.- increase." 
After legislation designed to correct these inequities had been 
proposed, the state Senate and House Committees with responsibility 
for the legislation held public hearings on the bills. Representatives 
of the major oil companies appeared at the hearings in opposition 
to the proposed legislation. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Four distinct arguments are f~rwarded by 
the various ·appellants · and amici as to why the Maryland 
statute is invalid--two constitutional and two statutory. 
- 7 -
6 
First, . it is argued that the divestiture' provision of the stat-
Ute is an invalid exercise of the police power in violation 
of due process. Secondly, the statute is said to violate 
the commerce clause in denying out-of-state co~petitors 
access to local retail gasoline markets and thus discriminating 
against interstate commerce. Third, the oil companies allege 
that Section F of the statute conflicts with and is thus 
preempted by the Federal Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act 
of 1973 (FEPAA). Fourth and last, the oil companies allege 
that Section D is inconsistent with the Clayton Act as amended 
by the Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.C. §13 (1970). 
The details of these contentions are given,infra. 
4. DISCUSSION · 
a.) Due Process: Appellants' due process argument was the 
6 
Not all of the four contentions were pressed by each of the 
appellants or by each of the amici. Most of the briefs concentrated 
on the commerce clause and Robinson-Patman issues. 
The three motions for leave to file amici briefs in support 
of appellants (with the attached briefs) should, I believe, be 
granted. The State opposes one such motion by the Chamber of Commerce 
on the mutually inconsistent grounds that a) the arguments presented by 
the Chamber of Commerce are duplicative of the arguments of the 
appellants and b) that the State should not be burdened by having 
to respond to additional arguments. The State also opposes 
the motion for leave to file submitted by Champlin Petroleum Co. , 
et al. The contents of Champlin's brief and the reasons for _allowing 






one they relied on most heavily below. They contended, as the trial cour 
held, that the divestiture provisions of the statute (Sections 
Band C) are an invalid exercise of the State's police 
power. rNotwithstanding the emphasis with which this 
point was apparently pressed in the Maryland CA, it has 
now been all but abandoned. Only one of the jurisdictional 
statements and one of the amicus briefs even raise the issue. 
These two briefs (by Continental Oil Co., et ·al, and 
Pacific Legal Foundation) argue that the Maryland statute 
lacks a rational relation to any constitulonally permissible 
objective. This contention was effectively answered by 
the CA. It began by noting that the function of the courts 
in reviewing, under the due process clause, state legislation 
on economic regulation is "v..ery limited." Quoting extensively 
from this Court's decisions, the CA held the Ac't to -be 
easily immune from judicial invalidation. The CA acknowledged 
that the oil companies had presented evidence questioning the 
wisdom and efficacy of the Act but held that ~hey had not shown the Act 
be "arbitrary" or that there are "no considerations relating to 
the public welfare by which it can be supported." In short, 
the CA's . opinion on this point appears to have properly applied 
well-established constitUional principles to the facts before it. 
Furthermore, most of the appellants have all but conceded the correctn 
of the CA's conclusion. 
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· b.) Commerce clause: The contention that the Maryland 
statute runs afoul of the commerce clause is more troubling. 
The CA considered several Supreme Court decisions that_: ~ truck 
down state statutes regulating the production and sale of 
a commodity as violative of the\~.comrnerce clause. 
Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 u.s. 349 (1951); H.P. Hood & Sons 
v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, ~94 
U.S. 511 (1935). TheCA proceeded to distinguish the Maryland 
statute from the statutes considered in those cases on three 
different grounds. First, the CA stated that the Maryland 
statute would not restrict the free flow of petroleum 
products. According to the CA, the statute regulates a wholly 
intrastate activity, the retail marketing of gasoline . .. :.Producers 
and refiners would still remain free to import and sell petroleum 
products to wholesalers and to service station dealers. 
Secondly, the Gourt relied on legislative 
history in asserting that the purpose of the statute was to 
preserve competition within the Maryland retail gasoline 
marketing industry. Its purpose was not, in the Court's view, 
to protect local economic interests from the competition of oil 
companies engaged in interstate commerce. 
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Third, the Court stated that the statute does not have 
the effect of discriminating against out-of-state economic interests 
in favor of · · local interests. The statute is equally 
applicable to all producers and refiners, the Court pointed 
out. It did concede, however, that petroleum is not now 
produced or refined in Maryland and never has been. 
The Court also applied the three-pronged "balancing 
test" developed in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 
142 (1970) (a unanimous opinion), recently reaffirmed in 
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 
371 (1976) (unanimous except for Stevens, J. who did not 
participate). That test provides that, once the Court finds 
that a . "challenged exercise of local power serves to further a 
legitimate local interest but simultaneously burdens interstate 
connnerce," then: 
[1] the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will ... 
depend on the [2] nature of the local interest involved, 
and on [3] whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser 
impact on interstate activities. 
See also Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 
45 U.S.L.W. 4746 (June 20, 1977). Under this test, theCA 
concluded that "the divestiture provisions of the Act do not 
violate the Connnerce Clause." 
The appellants vigorously attack the reasoning of the CA. 
) They reject the CA's assertion that the statute regulates 
. • 
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a wholly intrastate activity," noting that the sale of petroleum 
products which are transported into a state has been regulated 
by Congress not only under the antitrust laws but also under 
the FEPAA. The appellants further note that this eourt 
has held that the fact that a state law may strike some 
in-state interests as severely as it strikes out-of-
state interests does not immunize it from a commerce clause 
challenge. Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416,432 (l946). 
Moreover, the appellants believe the CA gave undue emphasis 
to the fact that the statute does not forbid producers and 
refiners from transporting petroleum into Maryland for sale. 
The appellants proceed to argue that the statute does 
violate the commerce clause--and lessen competition in Maryland--
in four ways. First, the statute forces vertically integrated 
oil companies, such as Exxon and Shell, that engage in producing 
and refining to divest themselves of the approximately 209 
retail gasoline stations that they now operate in Maryland. 
Second, the appellancs ; claim that the Act makes it difficult 
for producers or refiners not currently distributing their 
products in the Maryland market ever to enter that market. 
The appellants point to their previous experience in attempting 
to enter new state markets where they lack a brand image and 
are unfan1iliar to the consuming public. In such a situation, it is 
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alleged, oil companies find it profitable to run their own 
retail operations until they build a volume of trade that makes 
it attractive for an independent dealer to lease a station 
from the company. Because companies of the size of Exxon have 
found it necessary to operate their own stations for a while 
before entering a new market , marketers with fewer resources 
would find it at least as difficult. Thus, the oil companies 
assert that the trial court was correct in finding that 
the seatute would keep out of Maryland major brand and, especially, 
private brand p.rt>ducers and refiners who currently market 
elsewhere out'·'not j.n Maryland. 
Third, the appellants allege that the Act makes it 
economically prohibitive for integrated private brand 
marketers, who are now marketing in Maryland, to continue 
marketing their products there. This is said to be so because 
private brand marketers sell brands of gasoline that tend to 
have less consumer recognition in a given market and must retail 
their product at prices lower than those at which advertised 
brands are sold. The appellants . clai~ that the private 
brand marketers have tried dealer operations and found that they 
cannot compete effectively because, inter alia, under the antitrust 
laws they cannot control the price of the products sold. 
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Fourth, the statute inhibits, according to the appellants, 
private brand marketers of gasoline that are not currently 
producers or refiners from integrating backwards into 
refining or production of petroleum products. Alternatively, 
the statute would drive such private brand marketers 
out of Maryland if they did choose to integrate backwards. 
Turning to the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church. supra, 
and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, supra, the 
appellants challenge the "legitimate local interests" that 
the CA found to outweigh the burdens which the statute places 
on interstate commerce. The appellants point out that the 
CA's conclusion on this point was based on only two findings. 
First, the CA noted that during the period of the gasoline 
shortage in 1973, some company-operated stations received 
greater allocations of gasoline than did dealer-operated 
stations, forcing many dealers out of business. Secondly, 
the CA stated that there was evidence that certain oil companies 
intended to increase the number of company-operated stations, 
from which the Maryland General Assembly might have concluded 
that this trend,"if allowed to continue," could substantially 
decrease competition and lead to the control of that market by 
a few major oil companies. The appellants argue that these 
CA findings must be considered in light of the trial court's 
- 13 -
finding--and what they allege was the State's concession 
7 
on appeal--that retail marketing of petroleum products 
in Maryland is, at present, "highly competitive." App. D, 
p. 99a. The appellants argue that neither finding justifies 
measures as drastic as those adopted in the challenged statute. 
They further assert, rather weakly, that less drastic (but 
sufficient) measures have already been adopted nationwide in 
the FEPAA and ·> . ·-the regulations promulgated thereunder. 
In overview, it seems clear that neither the §tate's 
arguments nor those of the appellants can be easily dismissed. 
Applying the three-prong balancing test of Pike and Great A & P 
Tea Co. is, therefore, difficult. The first factor to be 
considered--the extent of the burden--is, of course, what 
the oil companies stress. And even discounting their more 
extravagant claims, they are correct in stating that the statute 
will impose some substantial hardships. This was found by 
the trial court and, indeed, is all but self-evident from the language 
of the statute. The · burden falls most heavily on the three appellants 
7 
To support their contention that the State conceded this 
point, the appellants cite the State's brief in theCA at p. 7. 
That brief is not among the documents included in the appendix 
submitted to this Court. 
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that market exclusively through their private brand, company-
8 
operated stations. Officials of these companies indicated at 
trial that they might be forced to withdraw from the Maryland 
market if the statute were to become effective. (However, at least 
two of these company witnesses on cross-examination 
indicated that no firm decision had been made to withdraw 
if the statute~became effective, and that it still might be 
possible to distribute products in Maryland through dealer 
operations and on the wholesale market.) 
The second factor in the Pike-Great A & P Tea Co.test--
the nature of the state interest--was expressly considered by 
the CA. The findin~that theCA felt reflected the existence 
and dimensions· of }~ryland's interest were, as noted supra, 
the gasoline shortages at some of the dealer-operated stations 
during the 1973 gasoline crisis and the evidence that certain 
oil companies intended to increase the number of company-operated 
stations. The -"appellants do not deny that such findings show 
that there is a cognizable state interest at stake. 
8 
The major brands currently marketing in Maryland have, 
in the past, operated only a small percentage of the retail 
service stations which they supply. The burden on them, though 
real, is not severe. As discussed, supra, however, the statute 
would make it considerably more difficult for major 
brand or private brand integrated companies that are not now 
marketing in Maryland to begin business operations there (i.e., 
by supplying gaa ~ to independent dealers). 
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But, as the appellants stress, the relation of this 
second factor to the third factor is more complex. 
A respectable argument can be made that these local 
interests could be promoted as well with a lesser impact 
on interstate commerce. Although it seems facile to 
argue (as the appellants do) that existing federal laws and 
regulations are sufficient to handle the perceived problems 
in petroleum marketing, less sweeping state statutes would 
probably suffice. Certainly the fear that 
some oil companies intend to :i;.ncreas~ the number of company-
operated stations could have been alleviated simply by 
~J prohibiting the companies from opening such new stations. 
The extra requirement of divestiture of existing, company-
operated stations is more than is necessary to serve the 
asserted interest. Similarly, the possibility of company-operated 
stations receiving greater allocations of gasoline 
than dealer-operated stations during fuel crises would also 
seem susceptible to a solution short of the divestiture required 
by Section C. Indeed, prevention of misallocation of petroleum 
products by producers and refiners during fuel shortages is 
precisely the purpose of Section F. If this section is valid--and 
I 




c. )Federal Emergency Petroleum Al ,location Act of 1973 
The CA considered and rejected the contention that the 
Maryland statute is inconsistent with and thus pre-empted 
by the FEPAA. On this appeal, the issue is raised 
by none of the appellants and by only one of the amici, 
9 
Champlin Petroleum Co., et al. The State has filed an 
objection to Champlin's motion for leave to file its brief, 
alleging that, as to the commerce clause and Robinson-Patman 
issues, Champlin's brief is duplicative and that, as to the 
FEPAA issue, Champlin has no more than a remote interest 
in the question. Moreover, the State asserts, Champlin 
should not be allowed to raise a question "which, for good reasons, 
appellants apparently felt should not be presented to this 
Court." To the extent that the State is worried about duplication 
9 
Champlin, et al, are companies engaged in the petroleum 
industry in different capacities. Some are engaged in petroleum 
__ production, refining, and marketing; others are engaged only 
in petroleum refining and marketing. None of the amici group is 
engaged in petroleum production or refining ·in Maryland. Some of 
the amici group were and are engaged in marketing petroleum products 
in Maryland through retail stations. Others are not now 
engaged in any Maryland retailing. 
The motion for leave to file alleges that each member of the 
amici group is affected by the Maryland statute in that it affects 
the allocation policies of those who are now marketing in Maryland 
and forbids the opening of Maryland retail stations by those 
companies in the amici group that are producers and refiners. 
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of arguments, I do not believe the filing of Champlin's brief 
will present any great hardship to the State or to this Court. 
As to the FEPAA issue, Champlin's brief competently 
sets forth a problem that is likely to be of recurring 
importance and in which the amici group have a legitimate interest. 
Because the other side of the FEPAA problem is well presented 
iu -,the CA opinion, I again see little hardship to the State or 
to the Court in allowing Champlin to file its brief (even though 
the FEPAA issue is not addressed by the State in its motion to 
dismiss or affirm). 
All this having been said, however, I believe 
that the FEPAA issue was correctly resolved below and does 
not merit plenary consideration by this Court. The focus 
of Champlin's attack is Section F of the Maryland statute. 
It provides that during periods of shortages, producers, refiners, 
and wholesalers shall "apportion uniformly" gasoline and special 
fuels to all retail service station dealers "on an equitable 
basis." Champlin.coutends that this provision 
clashes with the FEPAA which provides for the promulgation of 
regulations for the allocation of petroleum productions. Champlin 
points to several factors affecting allocations · under the federal 
regulations which may allow allocations on other than the 
"uniform basis" required by Sectfon F. 
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. In considering this argument, the 'CA construed the 
Maryland statute to avoid the problems that the appellants 
there asserted that it raised vis-a-vis the FEPAA. The 
CA noted that, although the statute refers to allocation on 
a uniform basis, it also states tmt allocation is to be on 
an "equitable basis." "By thus modifying ·'·uniformly,·'· 
it would appear that the[Maryland General Assembly] 
contemplated that certain equitable factors might require 
variations in an otherwise uniform scheme of gasoline and 
special fuel allocation." CA opinion, App. at 3la. 
I do not believe that, under this somewhat strained 
interpretation, the Maryland statute is inherently in conflict 
with the FEPAA. Conflicts in the application of the 
two statutes can be considered when and if they arise. 
d.) Robinson-Patman Act: A much more serious question of 
possible state-federal statutory conflict is raised by the 
appellants concerning the Robinson-Patman Act. They contend 
that Section D of the Maryland statute is irreconcilable with 
Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act which provides that 
a seller can rebut a prima facie case of price discrimination 
violative of the Act ''by showing that his lower price . . . to any 
purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally 
low price of a competitor." See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 
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231 (1951); FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S .. 505 (1971). 
As noted supra, Section D of the Maryland statute requires 
that suppliers of petroleum products must extend all price 
reductions uniformly to all retail service stations supplied. 
Appellants' argument boils down to the claim that Section 2(b) 
allows exactly what Section D forbids. 
i) In considering the alleged conflict between the 
two statutes, the CA interpreted Section ~(b) in such 
a way as to avoid the conflict. According to the appellants, 
however, the CA's interpretation is inconsistent with 
virtually all other interpretaions. 
In Sun Oil Co., this Court specifically reserved 
the question of whether the Section 2(b) defense encompasses 
a situation where a supplier such as an oil company lowers its 
price to a retail dealer to enable the dealer to meet · the lower 
price of a competing retail dealer which lower price is subsidized 
by a price reduction from that dealer's supplier. 
The Maryland CA held that the oil companies' granting of such 
"competitive price assistance" (or "voluntary allowances") 
to t;hat supplier·• s dealers 
to meet a price cut of a competing supplier--which is plainly 
forbidden under Section D--is also not protected by Section 2(b) 
because Section 2(b) applies only when the competitive offer is 
made directly to the oil companies· own customers. 
( 
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As appellants point out, this holding answers the 
question reserved in Sun in a manner contrary to federal 
court authority as well as the stated policy of the FTC 
and the Department of Justice. FTC Report on Anticompetitive 
Practices in the Marketing of Gasoline, 3 CCH Trade Reg. Rep., 
,10,373 at 18,~45 (1967); Dept. of Justice, Report on the 
Robinson-Patman Act, 93-97 (1977); Bargain Car Wash Inc. v. 
Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), 466 F.2d 1163, 1175-76 (7th Cir. 
1972); Belliston v. Texaco Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 182 (lOth Cir.) 
cert. denied, 408 U.S. 9~8. But see Note, Gasoline Marketing 
and the Robinson-Patman Act, 82 Yale L.J. 1706, 1713 n. 44 (1973). 
ii.) The appellants also note that, in contrast to what 
they claim is their practice of tailoring price assistance to 
a particular competitive situation, Section D requires them 
to grant the same competitive allowance to ~ the dealers 
they SUP?;¥ in Maryland when an allowance is granted to even one. 
This does seem at odds with Section 2(b) which this Court has 
interpreted as a section "designed to protect competitors in 
10 
individual transactions," and as one which guarantees to a seller 
. 11 
a pro-competitive right of self-defense to meet his competition. 
10 
FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 431 (1957). See also 
FTC v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 324 U.S. 746, 753 (1945). 
11 
Standard Oil Co. v . . FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951). 
( 
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e) Importance of the Issues: As a number of the 
iurisdictional statements and amici briefs point out, statutes 
similar to that challenged here have been adopted or are being 
considered by more than 25 states. (There is same disagreement 
as to the exact number.) And, the dual market structure--
where company-operated retail outlets compete with franchised 
dealers--also exists in such industries as soft drink bottling, 
./ automobile and truck dealerships,automotive parts and service, 
fast food restaurants, and non-food retailers. To be sure, 
there is not as much impetus for regulation of these industries 
as there is with respect to the petroleum industry. Still, 
it is safe to say that the :Haryland sfatute does have some 
precedential importance both outside of the state and outside of 
the industry. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: In light of the decision below and 
its potential significance, I believe that the "questions presented 
[inthese appeal~ are so substantial as to require plenary consideration. ' 
Rule 15(l)(f) of the Sup. Ct. Rules. 
There is a motion to dismiss or affirm. 
8/26/77 Ellison Trial Court and CA ops in 
Joint Appendix 
I - 22 -
APPENDIX 
Chapter 854 provides (italicized portions are those added 
by Chapter 608): 
•.' 
"(B) After July 1, 1974, no producer o~ refiner of 
petroleum products shall open a maJor brand, 
secondary brand or unbranded retail service 
station in the State of Maryland, and operate it 
with company personnel, a subsidiary company, 
commissioned agent, or under a contract with any 
person, firm, or corporation, managing a service 
station on a fee arrangement with the producer or 
refiner. The station must be operated by a retail 
service station dealer. 
"(C) After July 1, 1975, no producer or refiner of 
petroleum products shall operate a major brand, 
secondary brand, or unbranded retail service 
station in the State of Maryland, with company 
personnel, a subsidiary company, commissioned 
agent, or under a contract with any person, firm, or 
corporation managing a service station on a fee 
arrangement with the producer or refiner. The 
station must be operated by a retail service station 
dealer. 
"(D) Every producer, refiner, or wholesaler of 
petroleum products supplying gasoline and special 
fuels to retail service station dealers shall extend 
all voluntary allowances uniformly to all retail 
service station dealers supplied. 
"(E) Every producer, refiner, or wholesaler of . 
petroleum products supplying g:1soline and special 
fuels to retail service station dealers shall apply all 
equipment rentals uniformly to all retail service 
station dealers supplied. 
"(F) Every producer, refiner or wholesaler of 
petroleum products shall apportion uniformly all 
gasoline and special fuels to all retail SPrvice 
station dealers during periods of shortages on an 
equitable basis, and shall not discriminate among 
the dealers in their allotments. 
"(G) The Comptroller may adopt rules or 
regulations defining the circumstances in which a 
producer or refiner temporarily may operate a 
previously dealer-operated station. 
"(H) The Comptroller may permit reasonable 
exceptions to the divestiture dates specified by this 
section after considering all of the .relevant facts 
and reaching reasonable conclusions based upon 
those facts." 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
WASHINGTON, D . C. 20543 
. ' 
February 15, 1978 
MEMORANDUM TJ TH COURT 
Re: Exxon C poration et al.; Shell Oil Co.; 
Con· ntal Oil Co. et al.; Gulf Oil 
Corporation; and Ashland Oil, Inc. et al. 
v. Governor of the State of Maryland, et al. 
Nos. 77-10, 77-11, 77-12, 77-47 and 77-64 
The attached letter directed to the Chief 
Justice refers to the motion for divided argument 
in the above cases which has been distributed to 
the Court with "in chamber matters" for Friday's 
Conference. 
• 
I am somewhat nonplused since the request 
for divided argument was filed by his office. 
Attachment 
,.RAN C I S B. BURCH 
• rtOPN[Y 0[N [ FlAL 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ONE SOUTH CALVERT STREET 
14TH FLOOR 
BALTIMORE , MARYLAND 21202 
301 - 383 - 3737 
January 31, 1978 
The Honorable Warren E. Burger 
Chief Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Building 
1 First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
.JON F . OSTER 
GEORGE A NILSON 
DEPUTY ATTORN£'!"~ OENCRAL . 
Re: Exxon Corporation et al.; Shell Oil Company; 
Continental Oil Company et al.; Gulf Oil Corporation; 
and Ashland Oil, Inc., et al. v. Governor of the 
State of Maryland et al. 
Nos. 77-10, 77-11, 77-12, 77-47 and 77-64 
My dear Mr. Chief Justice: 
I apologize for writing to you directly on this 
case, and I should state to you initially that I do not believe 
my remarks which follow in any way prejudice or affect the rights 
of the Appellants. I should also add that I do not believe that 
my remarks are appropriate to any formal pleading before the 
Court. I have no objection to the contents of this letter being 
made available to the Appellants if you believe .it desirable 
that I do so. 
We have previously filed a Motion For Leave To 
Divide Oral Argument. The case breaks down into two clearly 
defined areas of the law, the commerce clause and the application 
of the Robinson-Patman Act. While there is certainly some 
intertwining of the two areas, as there must be in all cases, I 
believe that the structure of this case lends itself to divided 
argument particularly where the two attorneys whom I propose 
for the argument have mutually exclusive experience and expertise 
in the two areas of the case. 
I ask for a favorable response to our Motion in 
The Honorable Warren ~. Burger 
-2-
light of your suggestion to the State Attorneys General that 
the quality oe oral arguments in the Supreme Court by members 
of their staffs has often failed to meet the degree of 
excellence and importance which such arguments demand. On 
at least one occasion, at which I was present in your company, 
you asked the State Attorneys General to address themselves 
to the question of whether they were sending to the Supreme 
Court the best available people on their staff for oral 
argument and whether they were insuring that the level of prep-
aration for such arguments was receiving the necessary time 
and attention. It is in the spirit of your request for the 
best that I strive to put our best foot forward and ask that 
we be permitted to split our argument . 
In the Court of Appeals of Maryland, where an 
hour was allotted to each side for oral argument in this case, 
we used one of my two Deputy Attorneys General and one of the 
Assistant Attorneys General assigned to our Antitrust Division. 
If our Motion is granted, we would again use the Deputy Attorney 
General who argued the case below, and the Chief of the Antitrust 
Division who is the most experienced attorney in my office in 
antitrust law and who possesses the greatest degree of command 
over the antitrust facets of this case. At the same time, I would 
expect and instruct both attorneys to prepare themselves so that 
they can answer questions in either area of the case but to 
concentrate on the area of their particular assignment. 
I should further point out that the Appellants 
are represented by a panoply of attorneys too numerous to mention, 
all of whom are well-versed in constitutional and antitrust law. 
The brief of just four of the Appellants lists sixteen attorneys 
and five law firms and there is no question in my mind that the 
Appellants are provided with matchless legal representation in 
terms of experience and expertise. 
I am aware of the reasons why divided arguments 
are discouraged and the potential deficiencies in such arguments. 
However, I believe in the instant case the ability of the State 
properly to present its case in oral argument and, therefore, to 
assist the Court, will be inrrneasurably enhanced if such argument 
can be divided. Thanking you for your kind consideration, I am 
Respectfully yours, 
~7 (~ r-:!_ L 
- / '1 ('- '\!.~ ~\ ' / \ . )t..\..~-· L--
1 ·"' Franc~s .tr'. Burch 







No. 77-10 Exxon Corp. v. Governor of MaryJ!nd 
,, ~e 
Dear John: 
~ ~lease show at the end of the next draft of your 
opinion that I took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
Sincerely, .. 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
,, 
